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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I extend the organizational design literature by examining
how the delegation choice is affected by the ability to resolve the incentive problem
caused by this delegation. Based on the seminal papers by Grossman and Hart (1986)
and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994), I argue that the ability to resolve the incentive
problem depends on the contractibility of ﬁnancial performance measures versus non-
ﬁnancial performance measures, where the contractibility depends on the performance
measure properties sensitivity, precision, and veriﬁability. The empirical results show
that, if ﬁnancial performance measures are ‘‘good’’ (‘‘poor’’) incentive measures, i.e.,
high (low) on sensitivity, precision, and veriﬁability, then using these measures for in-
centive purposes increases (decreases) delegation. Overall, the results are consistent
with the argument that ﬁrms design their decision-making process around the quality
of contractible performance measures.
Keywords: delegation; performance measure properties; contractibility; ﬁnancial vs.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I
n this paper, I examine how the quality of contractible performance measures affects
the delegation choice. There is a large stream of literature on the design of incentive
systems and the design of these systems for lower-level managers has received increased
attention in the empirical accounting literature. For example, Bushman et al. (1995) and
Keating (1997) examine the factors associated with the importance of speciﬁc types of
performance measures used to reward lower-level managers. Although these studies provide
valuable insights into the incentives provided to lower-level managers, none of these studies
incorporate the link between delegation and incentives. This omission is likely to be prob-
lematic given that the delegation choice is one of the crucial organizational design variables
and affects the extent to which incentives need to be provided.
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Empirical studies that address the determinants of delegation are rare. Baiman et al.
(1995) examine the impact of the relative expertise of the principal and the relative im-
portance of the business unit on the decision rights allocated to the business unit manager,
but they ignore the effect of incentives. Recent studies by Nagar (2002), Abernethy et al.
(2004), and Demers et al. (2004) do address the effect of performance measurement and
incentives on delegation, but generally fail to ﬁnd such an effect. For example, Nagar (2002)
ﬁnds that incentive-based pay, which in his setting is predominantly based on earnings,
does not affect delegation, although delegation does increase incentive-based pay. Similarly,
Abernethy et al. (2004) ﬁnd that the relative use of ﬁnancial performance measures for
incentive purposes does not affect the extent of delegation, but delegation does increase the
emphasis on these measures. These results seem to suggest that once we delegate, we
resolve the incentive problem by emphasizing ﬁnancial measures for incentive purposes,
but being able to resolve the incentive problem by emphasizing ﬁnancial measures does
not allow us to delegate. From a theoretical perspective, this conclusion is problematic,
since the argument for the former relationship assumes the existence of the latter.
In this paper, I extend the organizational design literature by examining how the del-
egation choice is affected by the ability to resolve the incentive problem caused by this
delegation. Based on the seminal papers by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1994), I argue that the ability to resolve the incentive problem depends on the
quality of contractible performance measures and, more speciﬁcally, on the quality of per-
formance measures that aggregate information about all actions. An aggregate performance
measure can complement the delegation choice because it provides the agent with the
required discretion and the principal with an instrument to constrain the extraction of private
beneﬁts (Prendergast 2002). Comprehensive ﬁnancial (accounting) measures are the most
aggregate performance measures because they ultimately reﬂect the consequences of all
decisions. However, the degree to which this aggregation feature can be exploited depends
on the costs of contracting on ﬁnancial measures. The more sensitive, precise, and veriﬁable
ﬁnancial measures are relative to other (nonﬁnancial) measures, the less costly it is to
contract on ﬁnancial measures. As a result, the better the relative incentive properties (qual-
ity) of ﬁnancial performance measures, the greater their relative incentive use can comple-
ment the delegation choice, and thus the greater the extent of delegation.
I measure delegation as the day-to-day allocation of decision rights and the reason for
using this particular measure is threefold. First, this measure of delegation allows for within-
ﬁrm variation, which is necessary given the data limitations of using multiple respondents
within a ﬁrm. Second, this measure of delegation has been used by Nagar (2002), Abernethy
et al. (2004), and Demers et al. (2004) and allows me to tie my results back to these studies.
Last, but not least, in contrast to more structural ways to implement delegation, such as
divisionalization, the allocation of decision rights is the aspect of delegation that is most
likely to be affected by incentive choices.
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it empirically shows
how the quality of contractible performance measures affects the delegation choice. More
speciﬁcally, it shows that the relative incentive use of aggregate ﬁnancial performance
measures increases delegation when these measures have good incentive properties, which
provides evidence that ﬁnancial measures do play a role in the decision to delegate. Second,
the results provide a plausible explanation for why previous research has been unable to
ﬁnd an effect of performance measurement and incentives on delegation, since these studies
ignore the properties underlying the performance measures used for incentive purposes.
Finally, it extends a small, but growing literature on the determinants of organizational
design choices and enhances our knowledge of the interrelation between these choices.Performance Measure Properties and Delegation 899
The Accounting Review, July 2006
The data that I use in the empirical analysis consist of both survey data and archival
data, the latter of which is used to validate the use of performance measures for incentive
purposes. I deﬁne the use of performance measures for incentive purposes broadly in this
paper. That is, it reﬂects how important the performance measures are for periodic evalu-
ations, salary increases, annual bonuses, and promotion possibilities. I choose these aspects
because they match the type of incentives provided to the managers participating in this
study. The performance measure properties that I examine relate to the extent to which a
performance measure is inﬂuenced by (1) the manager’s actions (sensitivity), (2) factors
outside the control of the manager (precision), and (3) the measurement process
(veriﬁability).
I ﬁnd that, after controlling for the marginal beneﬁts of delegation, the greater the
relative sensitivity and precision of ﬁnancial performance measures, the greater the returns
to delegation when using these measures for incentive purposes. I further ﬁnd that the
greater the relative veriﬁability of ﬁnancial performance measures, the greater the extent of
delegation. Additional tests indicate that if ﬁnancial performance measures are ‘‘poor’’
incentive measures, i.e., low on sensitivity, precision, and veriﬁability, then using these
measures for incentive purposes creates an incentive-related cost of delegation and thus
decreases delegation (cf., Nagar 2002). In contrast, if ﬁnancial measures are ‘‘good’’ in-
centive measures, then using these measures for incentive purposes complements delegation
choice and thus increases delegation (cf., Abernethy et al. 2004). These results are consis-
tent with the argument that ﬁrms design their decision-making process around the quality
of contractible performance measures (Prendergast 2002; Holmstrom and Milgrom 1994;
Grossman and Hart 1986). When it is difﬁcult or costly to contract on ﬁnancial performance,
ﬁrms reduce the need for incentive contracting by lowering the extent of delegation. Finally,
robustness checks corroborate the above ﬁndings.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, I present the theo-
retical analysis and hypothesis development. In Section III, I describe the sample selection
and data collection and in Section IV the variable measurement and empirical speciﬁcation.
I discuss the empirical results in Section V. Finally, I provide a summary and conclusion
in Section VI.
II. THEORY
Delegation and the Quality of Contractible Performance Measures
Organizational design, including the allocation of decision rights and the design of
incentive systems, is the basic problem addressed by agency theory. In general, agency
theory analyzes the situation in which a principal delegates authority to an agent and designs
an incentive contract to motivate this risk and work-averse agent. The principal delegates
authority to the agent because the agent has better decision-relevant information that is too
costly to transfer due to, for example, the environmental uncertainty (Jensen and Meckling
1992). By doing this, the principal inevitably creates an incentive problem, which needs to
be resolved through incentive contracting (Holmstrom 1979). Both Grossman and Hart
(1986) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) indicate that the design of ﬁrms reﬂect these
contracting problems. These models demonstrate that when it is difﬁcult or costly to con-
tract on performance, ﬁrms arrange their affairs so as to reduce the need for incentive
contracting (see also, Holmstrom 1999). The optimal allocation of decision rights is there-
fore affected by the ability to resolve the incentive problem caused by this allocation
(Hubbard 2000).
To provide a simple formalization of the above discussion, I specify the value of del-
egation V as follows (cf., Baker and Hubbard 2003):900 Moers
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V  V  ms  M(s,) (1)
where V is a ﬁxed quantity, s is the scope of the manager’s activities due to the allocation
of decision rights, m is the marginal beneﬁt of allocating decision rights,  is the ability to
resolve the incentive problem, and M(s,) is agency costs. I assume that M1  0, M11  0,
M2  0, and M12  0, i.e., agency costs are increasing and convex in delegation, agency
costs are decreasing in the ability to resolve the incentive problem, and the increased agency
costs associated with delegation are lower the greater the ability to contract.
The optimal allocation of decision rights is then determined by setting the marginal
costs of this allocation equal to the marginal revenues, i.e.:
m  M (s*,). (2) 1
Given the above assumptions, Equation (2) is invertible and the optimal allocation of de-
cision rights is characterized by:
s*  (m,). (3)
Equation (3) indicates that the optimal allocation of decision rights increases with increases
in (a) the marginal beneﬁts of delegation and (b) the ability to resolve the incentive problem
caused by delegation. In this paper, I argue that the incentive properties (or quality) of
some performance measures give these measures inherently greater potential to resolve the
delegation-incentive problem, but the degree to which this potential can be exploited de-
pends upon the cost to contract on these measures relative to other measures.
Delegation and Financial versus Nonﬁnancial Performance Measures
Broadening the scope of an agent’s activities by delegating more decision rights pro-
vides the agent with substantial degrees of freedom to make trade-offs among these activ-
ities (Prendergast 2002; Jensen 2001). This creates a need for performance measures that
allow for (more) discretion, but at the same time creates a need for constraining the agent’s
actions to prevent the extraction of private beneﬁts.
Prendergast (2002) argues that this delegation-incentive problem can be addressed by
tying pay to an aggregate measure of performance. ‘‘Aggregate’’ performance measures are
measures that provide (some) information about ‘‘all’’ actions, while ‘‘speciﬁc’’ perform-
ance measures are measures that provide (some) information about a subset of actions. The
use of an aggregate measure provides incentives for the agent to make trade-offs among
all available activities, supporting the delegation of decision rights (Prendergast 2002). The
aggregate measure also allows the principal to constrain the agent’s actions to those in the
principal’s interest by tying this measure to pay. As a result, an aggregate performance
measure can complement the delegation choice by allowing discretion to those with
decision-relevant information (the agent), while also providing those lacking this informa-
tion (the principal) with an instrument to constrain the extraction of private beneﬁts (cf.,
Prendergast 2002).1
1 Two other reasons for why aggregate measures complement the delegation choice are the following. First, when
broadening the scope of activities, it is simply too costly to have performance measures for each type of activity
(Ittner and Larcker 2002; Banker and Datar 1989; Holmstrom and Milgrom 1987), which results in an increased
preference for aggregate measures. Second, aggregation complements delegation as it allows the ﬁrm to econ-
omize on bounded rationality (Arya et al. 2004; Williamson 1975).Performance Measure Properties and Delegation 901
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In contrast, using speciﬁc measures for subsets of the agent’s available actions reduces
the ability to make trade-offs, which effectively reduces delegation (Abernethy et al. 2004;
Jensen 2001). Moreover, since the beneﬁts of delegation are highest in settings where the
principal has no idea what the agent should be doing, it is difﬁcult to tie pay to multiple
speciﬁc performance measures because the principal is unable to identify the speciﬁc actions
the agent should take and, therefore, the speciﬁc measures and their weighting (Prendergast
2002).
Comprehensive ﬁnancial (accounting) measures, such as net income or return on assets,
represent the most aggregate performance measures because the full consequences of every
action the agent takes ultimately ﬂow through the ﬁnancial statements. Various types of
nonﬁnancial performance measures can also aggregate information about the agent’s actions
to some extent. For example, market-share provides information about all of the agent’s
customer acquisition decisions. Similarly, defect rates provide information about all of the
agent’s quality improvement activities. However, neither measure reﬂects the full conse-
quences of these decisions, such as the costs of achieving market-share or defect goals or
their revenue implications.2 More importantly, they do not capture decisions other than
customer acquisition and/or quality initiatives. In this respect, nonﬁnancial measures are
‘‘speciﬁc’’ performance measures, in the sense that they provide (some) information about
a speciﬁc subset of actions (cf., Ittner and Larcker 1998; Fisher 1995; Wruck and Jensen
1994). This suggests that the principal will prefer the incentive use of comprehensive ﬁ-
nancial measures to the incentive use of more speciﬁc nonﬁnancial measures when dele-
gation is greater.
However, the extent to which this aggregation feature of ﬁnancial performance mea-
sures can be exploited for delegation purposes depends on the associated contracting costs.
The contracting costs are driven by the incentive properties of the performance measures
and in particular by the extent to which these measures are sensitive, precise, and veriﬁable.
In general, the more precise and veriﬁable a measure, and the more sensitive it is to man-
agerial actions, the greater the returns to using this measure for incentive purposes, relative
to other measures (Feltham and Xie 1994; Banker and Datar 1989; Holmstrom 1979). The
costs of contracting on aggregate ﬁnancial measures can therefore be determined by using
the speciﬁc nonﬁnancial measures as a benchmark, i.e., the more sensitive, precise, and
veriﬁable ﬁnancial measures are relative to nonﬁnancial measures, the less costly it is to
contract on the ﬁnancial measures.
As a result, the better the relative incentive properties (or quality) of ﬁnancial perform-
ance measures, the greater the relative incentive use of these measures is able to address
the incentive problem associated with delegation and, thus, the greater the extent of dele-
gation.3 Within this context, the ability to resolve the incentive problem  in Equation (3)
can therefore be written as:
2 As an example, an agent could dramatically drop the price and/or increase expenditures on advertising and
customer service to increase market-share. Although this increase in market-share makes this measure infor-
mative about the two decisions, it does not reﬂect the full revenue and cost consequences of these decisions.
3 I focus on the relative incentive use for the following reason. The argument is that aggregation of information
for incentive purposes has the potential to complement delegation. Even though a higher absolute use of ﬁnancial
measures implies a higher absolute use of aggregate measures, this does not necessarily imply more aggregation
for incentive purposes. In a given period, the absolute use of nonﬁnancial measures could be as high or even
higher, which results in an emphasis on more speciﬁc measures and, thus, less overall aggregation. The relative
incentive use of ﬁnancial measures more accurately reﬂects the focus on overall aggregation and is also consistent
with Abernethy et al. (2004) and Demers et al. (2004).902 Moers
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INC QUAL FIN FIN    (4)
INC QUAL NONFIN NONFIN
and the optimal delegation of decision rights s* as:
INC QUAL FIN FIN s*   m,  (5)  INC QUAL NONFIN NONFIN
where INCFIN (INCNONFIN) is the incentive use of ﬁnancial (nonﬁnancial) performance mea-
sures and QUALFIN (QUALNONFIN) is the quality of ﬁnancial (nonﬁnancial) performance
measures, as determined by the incentive properties. Equation (5) shows that the impact of
the relative incentive use of ﬁnancial performance measures on delegation is conditional
on the relative quality of these measures.4 Based on the above discussion, I state the fol-
lowing hypothesis.
H1: The impact of the relative incentive use of ﬁnancial performance measures on the
extent of delegation is increasing in the relative quality of these measures, as
reﬂected by their relative incentive properties.
III. SAMPLE AND DATA
To test the prediction stated in the previous section, I gathered data from multiple
sources. The primary data are survey questionnaire data, while the secondary data are
interview data and proprietary archival data. Survey data are available for 105 managers
employed in 6 ﬁrms. This section presents details on the sample selection and data
collection.
Sample of Firms
This paper focuses on how the incentive use and properties of different types of per-
formance measures affect delegation. In order to select the ﬁrms of interest to this study, I
used the following procedure. I contacted Hay Management Consultants (HMC) and ex-
plained the research question of this study. HMC provided a list of clients that were likely
to be eligible for this study, which contained the name of the ﬁrm, name of the Human
Resource Manager, ﬁrm address, and telephone number.
I called the Human Resource (HR) managers of 50 ﬁrms to explain the research study
and solicit their participation. Participation, at ﬁrst, meant giving an interview. Out of the
4 More speciﬁcally, Equations (3) and (5) imply that the following is true:
s* QUAL M () QUAL FIN 12 FIN   ()  0.   2 QUAL M () QUAL INC NONFIN 11 NONFIN FIN  INCNONFIN
I assume that the agency cost function M() is such that the cross-partial:
2  s*
INC QUAL FIN FIN     INC QUAL NONFIN NONFIN
is positive.Performance Measure Properties and Delegation 903
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50 ﬁrms, 15 (30 percent) agreed to an interview. Noteworthy is that the majority of
the ﬁrms (17) that did not agree to participate were ﬁrms that were currently implementing
a new or ‘‘updated’’ incentive system, which they characterized as ‘‘politically sensi-
tive.’’ Other reasons for nonparticipation were time constraints (11), reorganizations (5),
and mergers (2).
The interview with the HR managers served two purposes. First, the interview was
used to get a better understanding of the incentive system in place. It was important to
examine if performance evaluation and compensation were a real issue and to what extent
incentive compensation was important. This facilitated a more speciﬁc selection of ﬁrms
relevant to this study. Second, the interview was used to ask the HR manager to support
the research and to be its ‘‘champion’’ within the ﬁrm.
During the interviews, the content of participation was discussed in more depth. I
explained that participation implied (1) the selection of respondents, (2) the distribution of
questionnaires by internal mail, (3) the attachment of a letter of endorsement by the HR
manager or a higher-level ofﬁcial, (4) administrative support for follow-up procedures, and
(5) the provision of a detailed description of the respondents’ annual bonus plan. Of the
15 ﬁrms interviewed, six declined further collaboration. The reasons why these ﬁrms did
not participate were that they did not allow me to go ‘‘into the ﬁrm’’ (four ﬁrms) or that
they did not have an incentive system (two ﬁrms). Of the nine ﬁrms that agreed to partic-
ipate, three requested a more tailor-made study. To assure uniformity of the research design,
I decided to design a separate study for each of these ﬁrms and to exclude them from the
current study. As a result, the ﬁnal sample consists of six ﬁrms. For completeness, it should
be noted that none of these six ﬁrms have a long-term incentive plan, stock option plan,
or any other equity ownership plan. In general, the ﬁrms provide incentives to their man-
agers through periodic evaluations, salary increases, annual bonuses, and promotion pos-
sibilities. Descriptive statistics of the participating ﬁrms are provided in Table 1. The ac-
tivities of the ﬁrms relate to the provision of services, trading, and production. Firm size,
measured by the number of employees, ranges from 354 to 12,207.
Sample of Respondents
After the ﬁrms agreed to participate in the study, the HR manager of each ﬁrm selected
the sample of respondents. In making the selection, the HR managers were given three
criteria on which they should base their selection. First, the respondents should have man-
agerial responsibilities, either as head of a functional department or as head of a division,
business unit or something similar. To assure a minimum level of managerial responsibil-
ities, the respondent’s job design should have a weight greater than 400 Hay-points.5 Sec-
ond, the respondent should have an annual bonus plan. Finally, the respondent should have
experienced at least one annual performance evaluation cycle.
The HR managers were speciﬁcally asked to select as many respondents as possible
and as diverse as possible within the above three constraints. Within-ﬁrm variance in the
two main choice variables in this study, i.e., extent of delegation and the relative incentive
use of ﬁnancial performance measures, should be observed for the following reason. The
same performance measure in the same ﬁrm is unlikely to have the same incentive prop-
erties for different groups of employees within the ﬁrm. A diverse selection of respondents
should therefore create a sample of employees within a ﬁrm who contribute differently to
5 The Hay-points are based on the Hay Guide Chart Proﬁle Method, a system that compares the value of jobs
based on multiple factors such as accountability and know-how (Flannery et al. 1996, 20). A weight greater
than 400 relates to higher-level personnel.904 Moers
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics of Participating Firms
(n  6)
Firm Activity # of Employees Sample
A Provision of ﬁnancial services 1,690 9
B Trade of machinery and provision of technical services 12,207 28
C Provision of life and indemnity insurance 1,275 14
D Trade of pharmaceutical products 401 31
E Production of food products 7,482 5
F Financial leasing 354 18
(the same type of measure of) performance and are also exposed to different externalities.
Furthermore, within a hierarchy, it is each supervisor’s individual decision how much em-
phasis to put on what measure for incentive purposes (broadly deﬁned) and how much of
the day-to-day decisions to delegate, though obviously within certain boundaries. These
differences and (relative) freedom of choice should create within-ﬁrm variance in the var-
iables of interest. The selection by the HR managers resulted in 202 managers who were
asked to participate in the study.
Questionnaire Design
To maximize the response rate, I designed the questionnaire according to the guidelines
of Dillman’s (1978) Total Design Method. I pre-tested the questionnaire with seven aca-
demics and all six HR managers, which resulted in minor revisions of the questionnaire.
Furthermore, I administered a follow-up by telephone and mail. Of the 202 questionnaires
that were distributed, 114 were returned. This corresponds to an overall response rate of
56 percent. Of the 114 questionnaires returned, nine have missing data and the ﬁnal sample
therefore consists of 105 observations.
As the response rate is not 100 percent, though satisfactory, I conduct a test for non-
response bias. I split the sample at the ﬁrm-speciﬁc median response time and calculate a
t-test for differences in means for each of the variables of interest to this study. The results
indicate that there are no signiﬁcant differences between early and late respondents for any
of the variables. This suggests the absence of nonresponse bias.
For the two main choice variables in this study, i.e., extent of delegation and the relative
incentive use of ﬁnancial performance measures, the within-ﬁrm variance as a percentage
of total variance equals 72 percent and 73 percent, respectively. Furthermore, the within-
ﬁrm variance for delegation (relative incentive use of ﬁnancial performance measures)
ranges from 70–77 percent (70–79 percent) after piece-wise deletion of each ﬁrm, which
indicates that this variance is not driven by a single ﬁrm.6 As a result, the selection of
respondents was successful in terms of creating within-ﬁrm variance in the sample.
Proprietary Archival Data
Of the six ﬁrms, ﬁve ﬁrms provided archival data with respect to the annual bonus
contract of the respondents. This data is used to validate the survey-based measures of
performance measure use. Four ﬁrms have bonus contracts for their managers that are
uniform in terms of the percentage of the bonus that is dependent on ﬁnancial (nonﬁnancial)
6 Similar results apply for the piece-wise deletion of groups of two ﬁrms.Performance Measure Properties and Delegation 905
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performance, although the number of performance measures in each category can vary
signiﬁcantly across managers.7 However, I have no data with respect to the number of
performance measures for each of the respondents in these four ﬁrms. Two ﬁrms have
tailor-made manager-speciﬁc contracts, but only one ﬁrm provided that data.8 As a result,
archival data are available for 87 of the 105 managers for ﬁve out of six ﬁrms. The sample
used to validate the survey-based measure of incentive use of performance measures is
therefore a (large) subset of the full sample used to test the hypothesis.
IV. VARIABLE MEASUREMENT AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
In this section, I describe the measurement of the variables used in the empirical anal-
ysis and the empirical speciﬁcation used to test the prediction stated in Section II. All
measurement instruments are presented in Appendix A.
Delegation
I measure delegation of authority by taking the scale used by Gordon and Narayanan
(1984), which is similar to that used by Nagar (2002) and Abernethy et al. (2004). The
instrument asks the respondents to indicate the extent to which they have decision-making
authority with respect to (1) development of new products and services, (2) hiring and ﬁring
of personnel, (3) selection of large investments, (4) budget allocations, and (5) pricing
decisions. A ﬁve-point, fully anchored scale is used to indicate the level of authority. Prin-
cipal component analysis reveals one factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1, which ex-
plains 51 percent of the total variance. The factor loadings of the ﬁve items range from
0.58 to 0.82. Given that all ﬁve items appear to measure one underlying construct, I compute
the DELEGATION construct by summing and averaging the standardized scores of the ﬁve
items (Cronbach’s   0.76).9
Relative Incentive Use of Financial Performance Measures
I measure the relative use of ﬁnancial performance measures for incentive purposes by
comparing the importance of ﬁnancial measures for evaluating and compensating the man-
agers to that of nonﬁnancial measures. In order to measure this construct and the related
performance measure properties as accurate as possible, I focus on three types of perform-
ance measures: (1) ﬁnancial, (2) internal nonﬁnancial, and (3) external nonﬁnancial. This
classiﬁcation is partly based on prior literature (e.g., Ittner et al. 1997; Larcker 1981) and
partly on the interviews with the human resource managers of the participating ﬁrms. First,
the ﬁnancial performance measures are deﬁned as the ‘‘traditional’’ aggregate ﬁnancial
performance measures, such as return on assets and net income.10 Second, the internal
nonﬁnancial performance measures consist of nonﬁnancial measures that are directly related
7 As an example, one of the four ﬁrms provided me, on request, the opportunity to look into a number of manager-
speciﬁc contracts. For all these managers, 43.75 percent of the bonus was based on nonﬁnancial performance
measures, but the number of nonﬁnancial performance measures for each manager ranged from 4 to 12. Given
the incentives for a particular performance category, increasing the number of performance measures within that
category can lead to a dilution of incentives if managers need to spread their effort over too many measures.
As a result, the number of performance measures signiﬁcantly affects the actual level of incentives provided to
managers.
8 The archival data can be linked to the questionnaire data through codes. Each questionnaire contains a unique
code that is printed on the ﬁnal page of the questionnaire. The HR manager provides the archival data mentioning
the codes instead of the respondent’s name, which does not violate the anonymity principle.
9 In computing all constructs, I use unit-weighted average standardized scores because these have preferred psy-
chometric properties relative to regression estimates of factor scores (Grice and Harris 1998).
10 All examples presented with respect to each type of performance measure are measures actually used for
incentive purposes by the participating ﬁrms.906 Moers
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to the tasks performed. Examples of these performance measures are productivity, efﬁ-
ciency, and successful implementation of projects. Finally, the external nonﬁnancial per-
formance measures are deﬁned as those nonﬁnancial measures that reﬂect performance in
the market. Examples of these performance measures are customer satisfaction, market
share, and market growth.
For each type of performance measure, I use eight items to measure its importance for
(1) evaluation purposes, (2) monetary compensation, and (3) nonmonetary rewards. I use
these speciﬁc items because they are in accordance with the actual type of incentives
provided by the participating ﬁrms. A ﬁve-point, fully anchored scale is used to indicate
the importance of each type of performance measure for incentive purposes. To measure
the relative incentive use, I calculate for each item the difference between the scores for
ﬁnancial performance measures and the two nonﬁnancial performance measures by sub-
tracting from the ﬁnancial performance measure response both of the responses for the
nonﬁnancial measures.
Principal component analysis of the relative measures of the eight items reveals one
factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1, explaining 65 percent of the total variance. The
factor loadings of the eight items range from 0.73 to 0.88. Based on these results, I compute
the construct REL INC FPM by summing and averaging the standardized scores of the
eight items (Cronbach’s   0.92).
To validate this survey-based construct of the relative use of ﬁnancial performance
measure for incentive purposes, I test whether REL INC FPM is consistent with the rel-
ative weight on ﬁnancial performance measures (%FPM) stated in the annual bonus con-
tract. Despite the fact that the annual bonus is but one of the many types of incentives
provided to the managers in this study, the information contained in the annual bonus
systems should be sufﬁcient to allow for a validation of the survey-based measure. I split
the sample into two groups of approximately equal size based on the median reported
%FPM. I speciﬁcally test whether the mean within each subsample is signiﬁcantly different
from zero and whether the means between subsamples are signiﬁcantly different. The results
indicate that in the ‘‘low-%FPM’’ subsample, the mean relative incentive use of ﬁnancial
performance measures is signiﬁcantly negative (p  0.05; two-tailed), which implies that
the relative incentive use of ﬁnancial performance measures in this subsample is, on av-
erage, signiﬁcantly lower than in the full sample. The opposite applies to the ‘‘high-%FPM’’
subsample, in which the mean relative incentive use of ﬁnancial performance measures is
signiﬁcantly positive (p  0.01; two-tailed). Further, the means of the two subsamples are
signiﬁcantly different from each other (p  0.01; two-tailed). These results provide some
evidence of the validity of the survey-based measure.
Performance Measure Properties
To measure the performance measure properties, I develop new constructs. The survey
questionnaire contains, for both ﬁnancial and the two nonﬁnancial performance measures,
15 statements concerning the performance measure properties. A ﬁve-point, fully anchored
scale is used to indicate the level of agreement with these statements. The 15 statements,
listed in Table 2, relate to the extent to which each type of performance measure is inﬂu-
enced by (1) the manager’s actions, (2) factors outside the control of the manager, and (3)
the measurement process. For each item, I calculate the difference between the scores for
ﬁnancial performance measures and the two nonﬁnancial performance measures by sub-










































































Principal Component Analysis with Oblique Rotation of the 15 Items Related to the Properties of Financial Performance Measures
Relative to those of Nonﬁnancial Performance Measures











My performance expressed in ﬁnancial performance measures is strongly affected by
a. ... changes in economic conditions 0.74
b. ... decisions made in other parts of the organization
c. ... changes in the behavior of customers 0.75
d. ... changes in the behavior or strategies of suppliers 0.73
e. ... changes in the behavior or strategies of competitors 0.66
f. Whether I function well or not as a manager can be expressed accurately in ﬁnancial
performance
0.48




h. If I perform well as a manager, it is directly reﬂected in better ﬁnancial performance 0.79
i. Working hard leads to better ﬁnancial performance 0.77
j. Devotion and effort in my job leads to better ﬁnancial performance 0.78
k. Providing effort in my job leads to better ﬁnancial performance 0.79
l. The measurement of ﬁnancial performance is objective and veriﬁable 0.76
m. The measurement of ﬁnancial performance is done by objective persons 0.91
n. An independent person veriﬁes the measurement of ﬁnancial performance 0.88
o. The measurement of ﬁnancial performance is predominantly of a quantitative nature
Eigenvalue 3.66 2.45 1.91
aThis item is reverse-coded.908 Moers
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Principal component analysis of the relative measures of the 15 items reveals three
independent factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, explaining 53 percent of the total
variance. The factor loadings after applying oblique rotation are shown in Table 2. Exam-
ining the factor loadings reveals that the items loading on factor 1 relate to the impact the
manager has on performance, the items loading on factor 2 relate to the impact of uncon-
trollable factors, while the items loading on factor 3 relate to the objectivity and veriﬁability
of the measure. Given the results of the principal component analysis, I use the following
three performance measure properties in the empirical analysis: (1) relative sensitivity of
ﬁnancial performance measures (REL SEN FPM), (2) relative precision of ﬁnancial per-
formance measures (REL PREC FPM), and (3) relative veriﬁability of ﬁnancial perform-
ance measures (REL VERIF FPM). I measure the constructs REL SEN FPM, REL
PREC FPM, and REL VERIF FPM by summing and averaging the standardized scores
of the items that load on respectively factor 1, factor 2, and factor 3. Cronbach’s alphas
for these measures are 0.81, 0.70, and 0.83, respectively.
Control Variables
As stated in Equation (3), the extent of delegation is also affected by the marginal
beneﬁts of delegation, which relate to the cost of transferring knowledge from lower levels
in the organization to the top (Christie et al. 2003; Jensen and Meckling 1992). The greater
the knowledge transfer cost the greater the delegation of authority. Both the external en-
vironment and the internal environment of an organization affect the knowledge transfer
costs. The knowledge transfer costs are especially high in uncertain environments and in
larger ﬁrms (Christie et al. 2003; Jensen and Meckling 1992). If environmental uncertainty
increases, then there is a need to respond quickly to changes in the environment and, since
it is too costly for top management to acquire the necessary information for this purpose,
delegation increases (e.g., Nagar 2002). Furthermore, if the size of the unit is large, then
the amount of information that needs to be processed and transferred is too large and
therefore too costly, which results in increased delegation (e.g., Christie et al. 2003; Jensen
and Meckling 1992). Finally, if there are multiple hierarchical levels, then it is costly to
centralize decision making, since this would require direct communication with and the
transfer of knowledge from each individual layer (Melumad et al. 1992). Although such a
hierarchical structure can distribute the burden of information processing more evenly
within the organization, the beneﬁts of this are only received when decision rights are
actually delegated (e.g., Melumad et al. 1992, 1995), which implies that delegation is higher
when multiple hierarchical layers are present.11 Based on prior theory, I include environ-
mental uncertainty, size, and the number of hierarchical levels as control variables for the
marginal beneﬁts of delegation.
The environmental uncertainty variable is derived from the scales used by Govindarajan
(1984) and Merchant (1990) and consists of ﬁve attributes with respect to the respondent’s
work environment. The ﬁve attributes relate to the behavior of (1) customers, (2) compet-
itors, and (3) suppliers, as well as (4) technological developments and (5) political and/or
legal changes. Ten items are used to indicate to what extent each of these ﬁve attributes is
predictable and has on impact on the respondent’s job and unit. A six-point, fully anchored
11 The hierarchical structure is potentially an endogenous variable. However, such a structural decision is most
likely to precede the choices of the incentive use of performance measures and the day-to-day allocation of
decision rights, and I therefore assume that it is exogenous in the empirical analysis. The results presented in
the next section are not sensitive to the inclusion of the proxy for the number of hierarchical levels.Performance Measure Properties and Delegation 909
The Accounting Review, July 2006
TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics of Variables
(n  105)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Actual Range Cronbach’s 
DELEGATION 0 0.71 1.82–1.49 0.76
REL INC FPM 0 0.81 2.50–2.15 0.92
REL SEN FPM 0 0.71 1.63–1.94 0.81
REL PREC FPM 0 0.73 2.31–1.65 0.70
REL VERIF FPM 0 0.86 1.61–2.07 0.83
ENV UNC IN 0 0.86 2.71–1.78 0.62
ENV UNC OUT 0 0.85 4.04–1.91 0.62
SIZE 0.04 0.07 0.00–0.63 —
HIER LEVELS (dummy) 0.32 0.47 — —
See Appendix A for variable measurement and deﬁnitions.
scale is used, which consists of a ﬁve-point scale to indicate the extent of predictability
and impact and an additional option that can be used to indicate that the speciﬁc factor is
not part of the respondent’s work environment.
Similar to the way in which Khandwalla (1972) and Libby and Waterhouse (1996)
measure competition, I compute the environmental uncertainty variable by multiplying, for
each attribute, the ratings on impact by predictability and taking the square root of the
product.12 Principal component analysis reveals two factors with an eigenvalue greater than
1 that explain 60 percent of the total variance. After oblique rotation of the factor solution,
the following two indicators of environmental uncertainty are identiﬁed: (1) uncertainty
related to the input-side of the ﬁrm (ENV UNC IN; attributes: technological developments
and the behavior of suppliers) and (2) uncertainty related to the output-side of the ﬁrm
(ENV UNC OUT; attributes: behavior of customers and competitors). As a result, I mea-
sure ENV UNC IN and ENV UNC OUT by summing and averaging the standardized
scores of their respective two attributes (Cronbach’s   0.62 for both constructs).
I measure SIZE by the ratio of the number of employees within the manager’s unit to
the total number of employees. The number of hierarchical levels is proxied by the dummy
variable HIER LEVELS, which equals 1 if there are multiple hierarchical levels below the
manager’s unit, and 0 otherwise.
Descriptive statistics for all variables are provided in Table 3, while Table 4 presents
the Pearson and Spearman correlations between the independent variables, none of which
cause multicollinearity concerns. Table 4 shows that, among the performance measure prop-
erties, only REL SEN FPM and REL VERIF FPM are signiﬁcantly correlated (positive).
In addition, REL SEN FPM and REL VERIF FPM are signiﬁcantly positively correlated
12 The ﬁve-point scale for ‘‘impact’’ ranges from low impact (score of 1) to high impact (score of 5) and for
‘‘predictability’’ from high predictability (score of 1) to low predictability (score of 5). If the attribute is not
relevant, then a score of 0 is attached to that attribute regarding its impact and predictability. For each of the
ﬁve attributes, I multiply the score for impact by that for predictability, where higher scores for the product
term reﬂect greater uncertainty and the scores range from 0 to 25. The logic underlying the multiplication is
that given the impact of the attributes, increased unpredictability makes it more difﬁcult to control for this
impact, which increases uncertainty. Finally, for each attribute, I take the square root of the product term to





































Correlation Coefﬁcients between the Independent Variables
(n  105)
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. REL INC FPM 1.00 0.53*** 0.00 0.31*** 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.35***
2. REL SEN FPM 0.48*** 1.00 0.05 0.30*** 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.08
3. REL PREC FPM 0.03 0.04 1.00 0.08 0.21** 0.01 0.11 0.07
4. REL VERIF FPM 0.32*** 0.30*** 0.09 1.00 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.20**
5. ENV UNC IN 0.11 0.03 0.17* 0.03 1.00 0.17* 0.16* 0.15
6. ENV UNC OUT 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.26*** 1.00 0.04 0.21**
7. SIZE 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.09 1.00 0.02
8. HIER LEVELS 0.36*** 0.08 0.11 0.19** 0.16 0.22** 0.10 1.00
***, **, *Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed).
Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefﬁcients are presented below (above) the diagonal.
See Appendix A for variable measurement and deﬁnitions.Performance Measure Properties and Delegation 911
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with REL INC FPM. Finally, although the principal component analysis revealed two
separate constructs for environmental uncertainty, these constructs are signiﬁcantly posi-
tively correlated.
Empirical Speciﬁcations
Based on Equation (5), the hypothesis, and the above identiﬁcation of variables, I
estimate the following two equations to examine the determinants of the extent of
delegation:
5
DELEGATION    D   ENV UNC IN   ENV UNC OUT  ij 0 jj 6 ij 7 ij
j1
  SIZE   HIER LEVELS   REL SEN FPM 8 ij 9 ij 10 ij
  REL PREC FPM   REL VERIF FPM 11 ij 12 ij
1   REL INC FPM  ε 13 ij ij (6)
5
DELEGATION    D   ENV UNC IN   ENV UNC OUT  ij 0 jj 6 ij 7 ij
j1
  SIZE   HIER LEVELS   REL SEN FPM 8 ij 9 ij 10 ij
  REL PREC FPM   REL VERIF FPM 11 ij 12 ij
  REL INC FPM 13 ij
  REL INC FPM  REL SEN FPM 14 ij ij
  REL INC FPM  REL PREC FPM 15 ij ij
2   REL INC FPM  REL VERIF FPM  ε . 16 ij ij ij (7)
The variables relate to manager i in ﬁrm j and Dj is a dummy variable that is 1 if ﬁrm j,
and 0 otherwise, in order to control for ﬁrm-level effects. Both Equations (6) and (7)
estimate whether delegation is a function of environmental uncertainty (input- and output-
related), size, number of hierarchical levels, and the relative sensitivity, precision, veriﬁa-
bility, and incentive use of ﬁnancial performance measures. Equation (6) examines whether
there exists a direct association between delegation and the relative incentive use of ﬁnancial
performance measures. This equation is, more or less, consistent with the empirical spec-
iﬁcations used in previous studies (e.g., Abernethy et al. 2004; Demers et al. 2004) and is
therefore estimated as a ﬁrst step to tie my results back to these studies. Equation (7), on
the other hand, explicitly tests the hypothesis that the association between delegation and
the relative incentive use of ﬁnancial performance measures is a positive function of the
performance measure properties. That is, it examines whether ﬁnancial performance mea-
sures with better incentive properties lead to greater returns to delegation when using these
measures for incentive purposes. Hypothesis 1 speciﬁcally predicts that the coefﬁcients for
the interaction terms 14, 15, and 16 are positive.
Both Equations (6) and (7) are initially estimated using OLS. However, to control for
the possibility that the choice variable ‘‘relative incentive use of ﬁnancial performance
measures’’ causes endogeneity within the structural model of interest, I also estimate both
equations using two-stage least squares (TSLS). Given that Equation (7) examines inter-
actions between the endogenous variable and multiple exogenous variables, I estimate this912 Moers
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equation using the Heckman and Vytlacil (1998) two-stage least squares estimator (here-
after, HV-estimator). This method basically (1) estimates the endogenous variable (ﬁrst-
stage), (2) uses the predicted values to create the interaction terms, and then (3) uses the
predicted values and created interactions in estimating Equation (7) (second-stage).13
To apply TSLS, it is necessary to have instruments, i.e., variables that are correlated
with the explanatory variable (relevant) and uncorrelated with the structural error term
(exogenous). I use two instrumental variables for the relative incentive use of ﬁnancial
performance measures that are intuitively appealing and for which speciﬁcation tests indi-
cate they are relevant and exogenous. The instruments that I use for the relative incentive
use of ﬁnancial performance measures focus on the extent to which managers are able to
effectively communicate in ﬁnancial (nonﬁnancial) terms because of their functional back-
ground. I expect that the relative incentive use of ﬁnancial performance measures is higher
(lower) for those managers who are (not) able to effectively communicate in ﬁnancial terms.
Speciﬁcally, I expect that managers with a functional background in sales are able to ef-
fectively communicate in ﬁnancial terms, while managers with a functional background in
R&D are much more able to effectively communicate in nonﬁnancial terms. Although
functional background can affect the type of task that is performed, there is no reason
to assume that it affects the extent of delegation. Thus, I expect functional background to
satisfy both the relevance and exogeneity criterion.
To determine relevance, I test for the ﬁrst-stage exclusion restriction and the partial R2.
The ﬁrst-stage exclusion restriction tests the (joint) signiﬁcance of adding the instruments
to the reduced form equation, while the partial R2 tests how much of the unexplained
variance in the reduced form equation can be explained by adding the instruments (e.g.,
Wooldridge 2002; Bound et al. 1995). The results show that the test of the ﬁrst-stage
exclusion restriction is signiﬁcant (p  0.01) and the partial R2 equals 10 percent, which
provides evidence of relevance. To determine exogeneity of the instruments, I test for the
over-identifying restrictions. This test regresses the residuals of the second-stage on all
exogenous variables, where the R2 of the model should be close to zero if the instruments
are exogenous (e.g., Larcker and Rusticus 2004; Wooldridge 2002).14 The test of the over-
identifying restrictions indicates that the null-hypothesis of exogenous instruments cannot
be rejected. The problem with this latter test is that it can have low power to detect en-
dogeneity in small samples. I therefore perform a sensitivity analysis, which Larcker and
Rusticus (2004) label as the ‘‘unconstrained second-stage.’’15 The results of the sensitivity
analysis (for Equation (6)) show that the coefﬁcients for the instruments are very close to
13 An alternative for the HV-estimator to estimate equations with interactions between endogenous and exogenous
variables is the instrumental variable (IV) estimator (Wooldridge 2003). As stated, the HV-method uses the
predicted values of the endogenous variable and the interactions created with these predicted values as variables
in Equation (7). In contrast, the IV-method proposed by Wooldridge (2003) uses the predicted values of the
endogenous variable and the interactions created with these predicted values as instruments and subsequently
estimates Equation (7) using IV procedures. The difference between the HV-method and the IV-method is that
the latter method does not require the linearity assumption in the ﬁrst-stage reduced form equation to hold and
differences can thus arise if this requirement does not hold. Although the regression speciﬁcation error test
(RESET) proposed by Ramsey (1969) cannot reject the null-hypothesis that the reduced form equation is cor-
rectly speciﬁed, I re-estimate Equation (7) using the method proposed by Wooldridge (2003). The results, not
tabulated, are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 5 and show that all coefﬁcients have the same sign
and approximately the same magnitude as the HV-estimators.
14 Formally, nR2 is distributed 2 with K-L degrees of freedom, where K is the number of instruments, L is the
number of endogenous variables, and KL.
15 The unconstrained second-stage regresses the dependent variable on all exogenous variables, but where each
exogenous variable is replaced by the product of its original value and its ﬁrst-stage coefﬁcient. The resulting
coefﬁcients for the instruments should be close to each other and, therefore, close to the TSLS estimate if the
instruments are valid (Larcker and Rusticus 2004).Performance Measure Properties and Delegation 913
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the TSLS estimate and not signiﬁcantly different from each other (p  0.99). Overall, the
tests cannot reject the exogeneity of the instruments used. Based on these tests and the
above-mentioned arguments, I use two dummy variables as instruments, i.e., SALES MAN
and R&D MAN, which equal 1 if the manager’s functional specialization is Sales (R&D),
and 0 otherwise.
To test for statistical signiﬁcance, I do not rely on normal theory standard errors, but
rather use bias-corrected bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals (Jeong and Maddala 1993). I
use 2,000 iterations with random resampling to estimate the parameters and to compute the
bias-corrected conﬁdence for each parameter, which is used to determine the level of sta-
tistical signiﬁcance.16 The bootstrap method has the advantage that it requires fewer as-
sumptions than traditional methods and is generally more accurate. It mitigates problems
associated with normal theory standard errors due to, for example, sampling variation, non-
normality, and heteroscedasticity, which is particularly relevant for TSLS given its ambig-
uous ﬁnite sample properties.17
V. RESULTS
Performance Measure Properties and Delegation
Table 5 presents the results of the OLS and TSLS estimation of the determinants of
delegation.18 The results for Model 1OLS show that DELEGATION is negatively affected by
REL PREC FPM, positively affected by REL VERIF FPM, and not affected by REL
SEN FPM and REL INC FPM. This latter ﬁnding suggests that the relative incentive use
of ﬁnancial performance measures does not affect delegation in a simple linear fashion,
which is consistent with the ﬁndings of Abernethy et al. (2004) and Demers et al. (2004).
It further suggests that the more precise ﬁnancial measures are relative to nonﬁnancial
measures, the lower the extent of delegation, the more veriﬁable the higher the extent of
delegation, while sensitivity has no direct effect. Overall, these results are inconsistent with
delegation being directly associated with the relative incentive use of ﬁnancial performance
measures.
Regarding the control variables for the marginal beneﬁts of delegation, the results for
Model 1OLS show that DELEGATION is positively affected by ENV UNC IN, SIZE, and
HIER LEVELS. This suggests that more decision rights are delegated, the greater the en-
vironmental uncertainty on the input-side of the ﬁrm, the greater the size of the unit, and
the more hierarchical layers below the manager. Finally, Model 1TSLS provides similar re-
sults and I therefore refrain from discussing these in detail.
Columns four and ﬁve of Table 5 present the results of adding interaction terms between
the relative incentive use of ﬁnancial performance measures and the relative properties of
these measures, which provides the empirical test of the hypothesis stated in Section II.
The results for Model 2OLS are similar to those for Model 2TSLS with the notable exception
of the interaction term between REL INC FPM and REL SEN FPM. Although the co-
efﬁcient for the interaction term is positive in both models, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
16 The parameters of interest here are the OLS parameters in the OLS models and the second-stage parameters in
the TSLS models.
17 An additional beneﬁt of the bootstrapping procedure is that hypothesis testing is less troubled by potential
multicollinearity issues. Although it is not at all clear whether multicollinearity is an issue in regressions with
interaction terms (see, e.g., Hartmann and Moers 1999, 302), the general consequences of severe multicollinearity
are large standard errors and unstable regressors. The bootstrapped conﬁdence interval does not rely on normal
theory standard errors and does not rely on a single estimate, which makes hypothesis testing less sensitive to
multicollinearity.
18 Appendix B presents the results of the ﬁrst-stage of the TSLS regression, i.e., the estimates of the reduced form





































OLS and Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation of the Impact of the Relative Incentive Use and Properties of Financial




Model 1OLS Model 1TSLS Model 2OLS Model 2TSLS
Intercept 0.63*** 0.62*** 0.64*** 0.62***
FirmA 0.95*** 0.93*** 0.92*** 0.92***
FirmB 0.60*** 0.58* 0.56*** 0.50†
FirmC 0.66*** 0.65** 0.67*** 0.61**
FirmD 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.18
FirmE 0.44 0.40 0.47 0.36
ENV UNC IN 0.09* 0.10† 0.10* 0.09
ENV UNC OUT 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
SIZE 1.99** 1.95** 1.84** 1.77**
HIER LEVELS 0.40** 0.40** 0.39** 0.38**
REL SEN FPM 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.10
REL PREC FPM 0.11* 0.11* 0.07 0.06
REL VERIF FPM 0.16** 0.16** 0.16** 0.15**
REL INC FPM 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.05
REL INC FPM  REL SEN FPM# 0.11 0.20**
REL INC FPM  REL PREC FPM 0.15* 0.19*
REL INC FPM  REL VERIF FPM 0.06 0.00
Adjusted R2 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.35***
Incremental R2 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.17***
Partial R2 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.24***
***, **, *, †Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent, and 15 percents levels, respectively (two-tailed test using bias-corrected bootstrapped conﬁdence
intervals).
#Indicates signiﬁcant endogeneity at the 10 percent level based on the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.
The incremental R2 indicates the total variance explained by the independent variables incremental to ﬁrm effects. The Partial R2 indicates how much of the within-ﬁrm
variance is explained by the independent variables.
Model 2TSLS is estimated using the Heckman and Vytlacil (1998) two-stage least squares estimator.
The instrumental variables for the endogenous variable REL INC FPM in Model 1TSLS and Model 2TSLS are SALES MAN and R&D MAN. The ﬁrst-stage adjusted
R2 equals 44 percent and the partial R2 equals 10 percent. The test of the ﬁrst-stage exclusion restriction is signiﬁcant (p  0.01), while the test of over-identifying
restrictions indicates that the null-hypothesis of exogenous instruments cannot be rejected (p  0.90 in both models). This suggests that the instruments are relevant
and exogenous.
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indicates that the OLS coefﬁcient has a signiﬁcant downward bias.19 I therefore prefer to
interpret the TSLS results.
The results for Model 2TSLS show that there is a positive direct effect of REL VERIF
FPM and a positive interactive effect between REL INC FPM and respectively REL
PREC FPM and REL SEN FPM on DELEGATION. The ﬁrst ﬁnding is consistent with
Model 1. In contrast, the latter ﬁndings suggest that the relative sensitivity and precision
and the relative incentive use of ﬁnancial performance measures positively reinforce each
other in determining the extent of delegation. That is, the greater the relative sensitivity and
precision of ﬁnancial performance measures, the greater the returns to delegation when
using these measures for incentive purposes.20
The main effect for REL INC FPM in the interactive regression is not statistically
signiﬁcant. This main effect represents the effect of REL INC FPM on DELEGATION
when the values of all variables with which it interacts—i.e., the performance measure
properties—equal zero (Hartmann and Moers 1999, 300). Given that the zero value of the
performance measure properties represents the sample average (see footnote 9), this implies
that the relative incentive use of ﬁnancial performance measures does not affect delegation
‘‘on average,’’ which is consistent with Abernethy et al. (2004) and Demers et al. (2004).
To test whether this result holds in the extremes of the performance measure properties, I
use the estimates from Model 2TSLS to determine the partial derivative of DELEGATION to
REL INC FPM (see footnote 4):
DELEGATION
 0.05  0.20  REL SEN FPM  0.19  REL PREC FPM
REL INC FPM
 0.00  REL VERIF FPM.
This partial derivative reﬂects the impact of REL INC FPM on DELEGATION as a func-
tion of the performance measure properties. If ﬁnancial performance measures are poor
incentive measures, i.e., at the minimum observed values of REL SEN FPM (1.63) and
REL PREC FPM (2.31), delegation and the relative incentive use of ﬁnancial perform-
ance measures are signiﬁcantly negatively associated (slope  0.72; p  0.10, two-tailed).
In this setting, it is costly to contract on ﬁnancial performance measures relative to nonﬁ-
nancial performance measures and doing so creates an incentive-related cost of delegation,
which leads to less delegation (cf., Nagar 2002). In contrast, if ﬁnancial performance mea-
sures are good incentive measures, i.e., at the maximum observed values of REL SEN
FPM (1.94) and REL PREC FPM (1.65), then delegation and the relative incentive use
are signiﬁcantly positively associated (slope  0.75; p  0.10, two-tailed).21 In this setting,
19 Given that Equation (7) examines interactions between an endogenous variable and multiple exogenous variables,
the ‘‘standard’’ application of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (e.g., using the ﬁrst-stage residuals in the second
stage) cannot be applied. I therefore return to the basics of the test, i.e., test whether there is a signiﬁcant
difference between the OLS estimator and TSLS estimator, by using a bootstrapping procedure. More specif-
ically, I use 2,000 iterations with random resampling and calculate, for each sample, the difference between the
OLS estimator and the HV-estimator and compute bias-corrected conﬁdence intervals, which is used to determine
the statistical signiﬁcance of the difference.
20 The ﬁnding that there are signiﬁcant interaction effects in Model 2 essentially implies that Model 1 is misspec-
iﬁed. Although it is difﬁcult to predict the consequences of this misspeciﬁcation, it might explain why the
relative precision of ﬁnancial performance measures is signiﬁcantly negatively related to delegation in Model 1,
while such an effect is absent in Model 2.
21 The difference between the negative slope (0.72) and the positive slope (0.75) is statistically signiﬁcant at the
5 percent level (two-tailed).916 Moers
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ﬁnancial performance measures complement the delegation choice, which leads to more
delegation (cf., Abernethy et al. 2004).
These results provide further support for the prediction that ﬁrms design their decision-
making process around the quality of contractible performance measures (Prendergast 2002;
Holmstrom and Milgrom 1994; Grossman and Hart 1986). When ﬁnancial performance
measures are able to solve the incentive problem, ﬁrms can delegate decision-making au-
thority; but when it is difﬁcult or costly to contract on ﬁnancial performance, ﬁrms reduce
the need for incentive contracting by lowering the extent of delegation. In addition, these
results are important as they provide a plausible explanation for why previous research has
been unable to ﬁnd an effect of incentives on delegation. For example, Nagar (2002) ﬁnds
that incentive-based pay, which, in his setting, is predominantly based on earnings, does
not affect delegation. Similarly, Abernethy et al. (2004) and Demers et al. (2004) ﬁnd that
the relative use of ﬁnancial performance measures for incentive purposes does not affect
the extent of delegation. All three papers ignore the impact of performance measure prop-
erties and can, therefore, be considered an ‘‘on average’’ analysis (from a performance
measure properties perspective). The results in this paper suggest that the average effect is
likely to be zero because there are countervailing forces at play, which are driven by the
performance measure properties.
Overall, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the association between
delegation and the relative use of ﬁnancial performance measures for incentive purposes is
positively affected by the relative quality of these measures.22
Performance Measure Properties and Incentive Use
To provide more insight into why sensitivity and precision have an interactive effect
on delegation while veriﬁability has a direct effect, I examine the impact of the performance
measure properties on the relative incentive use of ﬁnancial performance measures, after
controlling for the two dummy variables that represent the functional background of the
manager and (the endogenous choice of) delegation. I use the variables related to the
marginal beneﬁts of delegation, described in Section IV, as instruments for the delegation
choice. More speciﬁcally, I use ENV UNC IN, ENV UNC OUT, SIZE, and HIER LEV-
ELS as instruments. I do not expect these variables to have an impact on the relative
incentive use of ﬁnancial performance measures over and above the impact of delegation
and speciﬁcation tests conﬁrm this expectation.23
22 A limitation underlying this conclusion is that I treat the performance measure properties as exogenous in the
empirical model. However, it is possible that ﬁrms actually design the performance measure properties condi-
tional on the decision to delegate, i.e., delegation affects the properties. If so, then this suggests a system of
(three) equations in which the choice variables are simultaneously determined. Ignoring the endogeneity of the
performance measure properties then potentially causes a simultaneity bias. The sign and magnitude of this bias
is generally unknown ex ante, since it requires knowledge of the (true) parameters one is trying to estimate.
Unfortunately, given the lack of valid instruments, I am econometrically unable to take the endogeneity of the
performance measure properties into account. However, the core of the problem is that delegation potentially
affects the performance measure properties. To examine this, I regress each performance measure property, i.e.,
REL SEN FPM, REL PREC FPM, and REL VERIF FPM, on the ﬁrm dummies and DELEGATION using
TSLS, with ENV UNC IN, ENV UNC OUT, SIZE, and HIER LEVELS as instruments. The results (not
tabulated) show that the extent of delegation does not affect any of the three relative properties of ﬁnancial
performance measures. Although these results do not rule out the potential endogeneity of the performance
measure properties, they do suggest that it is highly unlikely that the results presented in this paper are driven
by reversed causality and/or simultaneity.
23 The test of over-identifying restrictions indicates that the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments cannot be
rejected (p  0.571). In addition, the test of the ﬁrst-stage exclusion restriction is signiﬁcant (p  0.01) and
the partial R2 equals 14 percent, which provides evidence of relevance.Performance Measure Properties and Delegation 917
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Table 6 presents the results of the TSLS analysis, which indicates that REL INC FPM
is positively affected by REL SEN FPM and REL PREC FPM, but not affected by
REL VERIF FPM.24 That is, the more sensitive and precise ﬁnancial performance mea-
sures are relative to nonﬁnancial performance measures, the greater their relative use for
incentive purposes, which is consistent with the analytical literature (e.g., Banker and Datar
1989) and previous empirical evidence (e.g., Abernethy et al. 2004). The ﬁnding that sen-
sitivity and precision affect the incentive use of ﬁnancial performance measures, while
veriﬁability does not, provides a plausible explanation for why the former properties and
the incentive use of ﬁnancial performance measures positively reinforce each other in de-
termining the extent of delegation, while this reinforcing effect is absent regarding
veriﬁability.25
Table 6 further shows that DELEGATION has a signiﬁcant positive effect on REL
INC FPM, which is consistent with the expectation that delegation increases the relative
demand for more aggregate performance measures (e.g., Abernethy et al. 2004). Finally,
the dummy variable SALES MAN has a signiﬁcant positive effect on REL INC FPM,a s
expected, but the dummy variable R&D MAN has no signiﬁcant effect.
Aggregation versus Performance Measure Properties
The explanation that I provide for the positive interaction effects in Table 5 assumes
that it is speciﬁcally the aggregate nature of ﬁnancial performance measures that can com-
plement the delegation choice. However, an alternative explanation for the interaction ef-
fects is that the incentive properties matter, irrespective of the type of performance measure
and its level of aggregation. That is, the relative incentive use of any of the three types of
performance measures increases delegation if these measures have relatively good incentive
properties. If this alternative explanation holds, then it should not matter whether we con-
struct the relative incentive use and properties as (1) x relative to y and z, (2) y relative to
x and z, or (3) z relative to x and y. To examine the alternative explanation, I therefore re-
estimate Equation (7) twice, and replace the relative incentive use and properties of ﬁnancial
performance measures (x versus y and z) by:
(1) the incentive use and properties of internal nonﬁnancial performance measures
relative to those of ﬁnancial and external nonﬁnancial measures (y versus x and z);
(2) the incentive use and properties of external nonﬁnancial performance measures
relative to those of ﬁnancial and internal nonﬁnancial measures (z versus x and y).
If the alternative explanation holds and only the incentive properties matter, then similar
positive interaction effects should be observed after re-estimating Equation (7). If, however,
it is the aggregate nature of ﬁnancial performance measures versus the speciﬁc nature of
nonﬁnancial performance measures that matters, in addition to the incentive properties, then
no interaction effects or potentially negative interaction effects should be found.
The results (not tabulated) indicate that, for the internal nonﬁnancial performance mea-
sures, there are no signiﬁcant interaction effects (one positive, two negative) between the
relative incentive use and relative incentive properties on delegation. For the external non-
ﬁnancial performance measures, the interactions between the relative incentive use and all
24 Appendix B presents the results of the ﬁrst-stage reduced form equation for delegation.
25 The observation that, of all three performance measure properties, REL SEN FPM is the most signiﬁcant
determinant of REL INC FPM might explain why the OLS coefﬁcient for the interaction term REL INC
FPM  REL SEN FPM in Model 2OLS has a signiﬁcant endogeneity bias (see Table 5).918 Moers
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TABLE 6
Two-Stage Least-Squares Estimation of the Impact of the Extent of Delegation and
Properties of Financial Performance Measures on the Relative Incentive Use of Financial
Performance Measures
(n  105)








REL SEN FPM 0.47***
REL PREC FPM 0.09†






***, **, *, †Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent, and 15 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed
test using bias-corrected bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals).
#Indicates signiﬁcant endogeneity at the 5 percent level based on the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.
The incremental R2 indicates the total variance explained by the independent variables incremental to ﬁrm
effects. The partial R2 indicates how much of the within-ﬁrm variance is explained by the independent variables.
The instrumental variables for the endogenous variable DELEGATION are ENV UNC IN, ENV UNC OUT,
SIZE, and HIER LEVELS. The ﬁrst-stage adjusted R2 equals 33 percent and the partial R2 equals 14 percent.
The test of the ﬁrst-stage exclusion restriction is signiﬁcant (p  0.01), while the test of over-identifying
restrictions indicates that the null-hypothesis of exogenous instruments cannot be rejected (p  0.571). This
suggests that the instruments are relevant and exogenous.
See Appendix A for variable measurement and deﬁnitions.
three relative incentive properties are negative, two of which are signiﬁcant (sensitivity and
veriﬁability). These ﬁndings are consistent with the theory proposed in Section II and
inconsistent with the alternative explanation.
As a ﬁnal test, I re-estimate Equation (7) and replace the relative incentive use and
properties of ﬁnancial performance measures (x versus y and z) by the incentive use
and properties of external nonﬁnancial performance measures relative to those of internal
nonﬁnancial performance measures (z versus y), i.e., one type of (speciﬁc) nonﬁnancial
measure versus another type of (speciﬁc) nonﬁnancial measure. In line with the above
results, I ﬁnd no signiﬁcant interactions effects on delegation. Overall, these results lend
support for the argument that, in addition to the incentive properties, it is the aggregate
nature of ﬁnancial performance measures that allows for delegation.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, I examine the determinants of delegation. I ﬁnd that the contractibility
of ﬁnancial performance measures vis-a `-vis nonﬁnancial performance measures increasesPerformance Measure Properties and Delegation 919
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delegation. More speciﬁcally, the empirical results show that, if ﬁnancial performance mea-
sures are good incentive measures, i.e., have relatively high sensitivity, precision, and ver-
iﬁability, then using these measures for incentive purposes can complement the delegation
choice, which results in increased delegation. Furthermore, I ﬁnd that delegation is affected
by variables related to the internal and external environment, which is consistent with the
argument that delegation increases when the marginal beneﬁts of delegation are higher.
The results of this study are subject to several caveats. First, the variables used in the
empirical analysis are based on the managers’ perceptions. There is a possibility that the
managers’ perceptions of the variables of interest to this study differ from their superiors’
perceptions. Although I use proprietary archival data to validate the survey-based measure
of the incentive use of performance measures, which reduces the likelihood of these dis-
crepancies, I cannot rule out that differences in perceptions exist. However, the likelihood
that potential misperceptions drive the results is low given that these misperceptions should
also be systematic. Second, I only examine a subset of organizational design variables and
the analysis is therefore a partial equilibrium analysis (cf., Nagar 2002). Third, in any
empirical analysis of choice variables on both the right-hand side and left-hand side of the
equation, endogeneity remains an issue. Although I try to minimize the potential problems
associated with endogeneity, by carefully selecting instruments, testing the validity of these
instruments, and performing additional analyses, I cannot rule out the possibility that en-
dogeneity is present and the model misspeciﬁed. Fourth, all of the ﬁrms that participate in
this study are, or once were, clients of Hay Management Consultants. To the extent that
these ﬁrms have incentive systems that differ from incentive systems of ‘‘non-clients,’’ the
results might not be generalizable to ﬁrms that have not been ‘‘assisted’’ by compensation
consultants. Fifth, in the theoretical and empirical analysis of this paper, I assume that
incentive contracting is the only means to address the delegation-incentive problem. Other
common mechanisms exist such as the budgeting and resource allocation process that might
also be able to address this problem. Future research can examine to what extent these
other mechanisms play a role in the delegation-incentive problem. Finally, even though
ﬁnancial measures are more aggregate than nonﬁnancial measures, ﬁnancial measures them-
selves can be more aggregate or less aggregate (more speciﬁc). Furthermore, these measures
may vary along the dimensions of sensitivity, precision, and veriﬁability due to, for ex-
ample, cost allocations and asset allocations. Future research can examine to what extent
the incentive use and properties of more aggregate ﬁnancial measures relative to less ag-
gregate ﬁnancial measures affect the delegation choice.
Despite the limitations, this study makes an important contribution to the accounting
literature. Consistent with economic theory, it shows that ﬁrms design their decision-making
process around the quality of contractible performance measures, and particularly around
the contractibility of ﬁnancial performance measures. It further provides evidence that the
organizational design variables are simultaneously determined, which is consistent with
arguments made in the theoretical literature (e.g., Brickley et al. 1997; Baiman and Rajan
1995; Melumad et al. 1992; Milgrom and Roberts 1992).
APPENDIX A
Variable Deﬁnitions and Measurement Instruments
DELEGATION  the extent to which decision-making authority is delegated to lower-
level managers (measured by items a-e below).920 Moers
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Items Answering Format (1–5)
Who has the decision-making authority with respect to ...
a. Development of new products superior’s decision–my decision
b. Hiring and ﬁring of
personnel
superior’s decision–my decision
c. Selection of large investments superior’s decision–my decision
d. Budget allocations superior’s decision–my decision
e. Pricing decisions superior’s decision–my decision
REL INC FPM  the relative use of ﬁnancial performance measures for incentive pur-
poses (measured by the difference between ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial
measures for items a–h below).
Items Answering Format (1–5)
How much importance does your superior attach to xxx performance measures in ...
a. The evaluation of your performance no importance–very high importance
b. Periodic performance reports no importance–very high importance
c. Ofﬁcially rating your performance no importance–very high importance
d. Periodic discussions with you no importance–very high importance
e. Determining your salary increases no importance–very high importance
f. Determining your annual bonus no importance–very high importance
g. Increasing your chance of promotion no importance–very high importance
h. Increasing your authority within the organization no importance–very high importance
REL SEN FPM  the relative sensitivity of ﬁnancial performance measures to man-
agerial actions (measured by the difference between ﬁnancial and
nonﬁnancial measures for items f–k below);
REL PREC FPM  the relative precision of ﬁnancial performance measures (measured
by the difference between ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial measures for
items a and c–e below); and
REL VERIF FPM  the relative veriﬁability (objectivity and veriﬁability) of ﬁnancial
performance measures (measured by the difference between ﬁnan-
cial and nonﬁnancial measures for items l–n below).
Items Answering Format (1–5)
My performance expressed in xxx performance measures is strongly affected by:
a. ... changes in economic conditions fully disagree–fully agree
b. ... decisions made in other parts of the organization fully disagree–fully agree
c. ... changes in the behavior of customers fully disagree–fully agree
d. ... changes in the behavior or strategies of suppliers fully disagree–fully agree
e. ... changes in the behavior or strategies of competitors fully disagree–fully agree
f. Whether I function well or not as a manager can be
expressed accurately in xxx performance
fully disagree–fully agreePerformance Measure Properties and Delegation 921
The Accounting Review, July 2006
g. Many of the activities and tasks that I perform do not
s h o wu pi nxxx performance
fully disagree–fully agree
h. If I perform well as a manager, it is directly reﬂected in
better xxx performance
fully disagree–fully agree
i. Working hard leads to better xxx performance fully disagree–fully agree
j. Devotion and effort in my job leads to better xxx
performance
fully disagree–fully agree
k. Providing effort in my job leads to better xxx performance fully disagree–fully agree
l. The measurement of xxx performance is objective and
veriﬁable
fully disagree–fully agree
m. The measurement of xxx performance is done by objective
persons
fully disagree–fully agree
n. An independent person veriﬁes the measurement of xxx
performance
fully disagree–fully agree
o. The measurement of xxx performance is predominantly of
a quantitative nature
fully disagree–fully agree
xxx reﬂects ‘‘ﬁnancial,’’ ‘‘external nonﬁnancial,’’ or ‘‘internal nonﬁnancial.’’
ENV UNC IN  environmental uncertainty related to the input-side of the ﬁrm (mea-
sured by items c and d below); and
ENV UNC OUT  environmental uncertainty related to the output-side of the ﬁrm (mea-
sured by items a and b below).
Items Answering Format (0 [N.R.]; 1–5)
I. Impact of ... on your job and unit
a. Behavior and/or buying patterns of customers no impact–very high impact
b. Behavior and/or strategies of competitors no impact–very high impact
c. Technological developments in your profession no impact–very high impact
d. Behavior and/or strategies of your suppliers no impact–very high impact
e. Legal and/or political developments no impact–very high impact
II. Predictability of (changes in) ...
a. Behavior and/or buying patterns of customers very predictable–very unpredictable
b. Behavior and/or strategies of competitors very predictable–very unpredictable
c. Technological developments in your profession very predictable–very unpredictable
d. Behavior and/or strategies of your suppliers very predictable–very unpredictable
e. Legal and/or political developments very predictable–very unpredictable
SIZE  ratio of the number of employees within the manager’s unit to the total
number of employees; and
HIER LEVELS  dummy variable that equals 1 if there are multiple hierarchical levels
below the manager’s unit, and 0 otherwise.922 Moers
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APPENDIX B
TABLE B1
Reduced Form Equations for the Relative Incentive Use of Financial Performance
Measures and the Extent of Delegation
(n  105)







ENV UNC IN 0.06 0.10*
ENV UNC OUT 0.01 0.01
SIZE 0.74 1.92**
HIER LEVELS 0.29* 0.39**
REL SEN FPM 0.41*** 0.11*
REL PREC FPM 0.05 0.11*
REL VERIF FPM 0.07 0.16**
SALES MAN 0.56*** 0.02
R&D MAN 0.18 0.00
Adjusted R2 0.44*** 0.33***
Partial R2 0.10*** 0.14***
***, **, *, †Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent, and 15 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed
test using bias-corrected bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals).
See Appendix A for variable measurement and deﬁnitions.
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